Oregon Statutory Criminal Law

  1. Offenses Against the Public Order (e.g. Harassment, Nuisance)

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is harassed (either “electronically” or otherwise), the State may charge a defendant with harassing if the defendant threatens the victim with physical injury or the victim reasonably believes that the defendant will physically harm him or her. It may be apt in situations of cyberstalking and cybercrime, both of which are becoming increasingly common, and ORS 166.065(2) and (5) specifically relate to electronic harassment.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065 - Harassment

        (1) A person commits the crime of harassment if the person intentionally:

        (a) Harasses or annoys another person by:

        (A) Subjecting such other person to offensive physical contact; or

        (B) Publicly insulting such other person by abusive words or gestures in a manner intended and likely to provoke a violent response.

        (b) Subjects another to alarm by conveying a false report, known by the conveyor to be false, concerning death or serious physical injury to a person, which report reasonably would be expected to cause alarm; or

        (c) Subjects another to alarm by conveying a telephonic, electronic or written threat to inflict serious physical injury on that person or to commit a felony involving the person or property of that person or any member of that person’s family, which threat reasonably would be expected to cause alarm.

        (2) (a) A person is criminally liable for harassment if the person knowingly permits any electronic device under the person’s control to be used in violation of subsection (1) of this section.

        (b) Harassment that is committed under the circumstances described in subsection (1)(c) of this section is committed in either the county in which the communication originated or the county in which the communication was received.

        (3) Harassment is a Class B misdemeanor.

        (4) Notwithstanding subsection (3) of this section, harassment is a Class A misdemeanor if a person violates:

        (a) Subsection (1)(a)(A) of this section by subjecting another person to offensive physical contact and the offensive physical contact consists of touching the sexual or other intimate parts of the other person; or

        (b) Subsection (1)(c) of this section and:

        (A) The person has a previous conviction under subsection (1)(c) of this section and the victim of the current offense was the victim or a member of the family of the victim of the previous offense;

        (B) At the time the offense was committed, the victim was protected by a stalking protective order, a restraining order as defined in ORS 24.190 (Foreign restraining orders) or any other court order prohibiting the person from contacting the victim;

        (C) At the time the offense was committed, the person reasonably believed the victim to be under 18 years of age and more than three years younger than the person; or

        (D) (i) The person conveyed a threat to kill the other person or any member of the family of the other person;

        (ii) The person expressed the intent to carry out the threat; and

        (iii) A reasonable person would believe that the threat was likely to be followed by action.

        (5) As used in this section, electronic threat means a threat conveyed by electronic mail, the internet, a telephone text message or any other transmission of information by wire, radio, optical cable, cellular system, electromagnetic system or other similar means.

      2. Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.070 – Aggravated harassment

        (1) A person commits the crime of aggravated harassment if the person knowing the other person is a:

        (a) Staff member, knowingly propels saliva, blood, urine, semen, feces, or other dangerous substance at the staff member while the staff member is acting in the course of official duty or as a result of the staff member’s official duties; or

        (b) Public safety officer, knowingly propels blood, urine, semen or feces at the public safety officer while the public safety officer is acting in the course of official duty or as a result of the public safety officer’s official duties.

        (2) Aggravated harassment is a Class C felony. When a person is convicted of violating subsection (1)(a) of this section, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall impose a term of incarceration in a state correctional facility.

        (3) As used in this section:

        (a) Public safety officer means an emergency medical services provider as defined in ORS 682.025 (Definitions) or a fire service professional, a parole or probation officer, or a police officer as those terms are defined in ORS 181.610 (Definitions for ORS 181.610 to 181.712)

        (b) Staff member has the meaning given that the term in ORS 163.164 (Assault in the third degree).

      3. Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.090 – Telephonic harassment

        (1) A telephone caller commits the crime of telephonic harassment if the caller intentionally harasses or annoys another person:

        (a) By causing the telephone of the other person to ring, such caller having no communicative purpose;

        (b) By causing such other person’s telephone to ring, knowing that the caller has been forbidden from so doing by a person exercising lawful authority over the receiving telephone; or

        (c) By sending to, or leaving at, the other person’s telephone a text message, voicemail or any other message, knowing that the caller has been forbidden from so doing by a person exercising lawful authority over the receiving telephone.

        (2) Telephonic harassment is a Class B misdemeanor.

        (3) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subsection (1) of this section that the caller is a debt collector, as defined in ORS 646.639 (Unlawful collection practices), who engaged in the conduct proscribed by subsection (1) of this section, while attempting to collect a debt. The affirmative defense created by this subsection does not apply if the debt collector committed the unlawful collection practice described in ORS 646.639 (Unlawful collection practices) (2)(a) while engaged in the conduct proscribed by subsection (1) of this section.

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Lopez, 151 Or. App. 138, 949 P.2d 1237 (Or. Ct. App. 1997)

        • Procedural Posture: On appeal from conviction.

        • Law: Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.090 (Telephonic Harassment).

        • Facts: Defendant was charged with harassing the victim on or about November 14, 1995, by causing her telephone to ring and causing her to answer it, knowing that he had been forbidden from doing so by a person exercising lawful authority over the receiving telephone. During this time, the victim never physically answered the phone. She either declined to answer the phone after recognizing the defendant’s number on the caller ID, or she asked her husband to answer the telephone for her. The defendant was convicted, and he appealed the court’s denial of his motion to acquit, asserting that the State had failed to prove that the victim answered the telephone—a requirement under the statutory language.

        • Outcome: The court reversed, but remanded for entry of a judgment of “attempted telephone harassment,” a lesser included offense of telephonic harassment. The court explained that the term “answer” is “clear on its face, and any resort to legislative intent [wa]s unnecessary and inappropriate . . . The common understanding of ‘answering the telephone’ is the physical process of taking the receiver off the hook, placing it to one’s ear and saying, ‘Hello.’ We decline to adopt the ‘agency theory’ promoted by the state. If the victim is not subjected to the message or the voice of the harasser, regardless of whether the harm occurs, the victim cannot be considered to have answered the telephone. Thus, as the facts indicate here, the victim’s husband answered the telephone for her during the time charged in the crime or she recognized the number on her caller identification box and refused to answer. The trial court erred in concluding that the jury could find that the victim answered the telephone as required by ORS 166.090(1)(b).”1 The court, however, adopted the state’s alternative argument that the appropriate substitute remedy would be to remand for entry of a judgment of attempted telephonic harassment noting that “[a]ttempted telephonic harassment is necessarily a lesser included offense of telephonic harassment,” and here, the jury necessarily found that defendant had the required intent to commit telephonic harassment.2

        • Special Notes: The court recognized that the statutory language warranted a strange result, but that the legislature—not the courts—should resolve the issue: “The curiosity of our decision is that in cases such as this the victim must commit the act that results in the completed crime. Here, the victim determined from her caller identification box that defendant was calling. By declining to answer, she prevented defendant from completing the crime. On the other hand, had she decided to answer and subject herself to the unwanted and harassing telephone call, defendant would have been guilty of harassment. That curiosity, however, is an issue for the legislature to address.”3

      2. State v. Norgard, 156 Or. App. 190, 967 P.2d 499 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)

        • Procedural Posture: Appeal from defendant’s conviction for telephonic harassment.

        • Law: Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.090 (Telephonic Harassment).

        • Facts: Defendant called the victim’s home and left a message on her answering machine, stating that he had posted her photograph on the internet and that the photograph had received numerous “hits.” The victim listened to the message in its entirety and was highly upset by it. Defendant was charged with the crime of telephonic harassment. On appeal, he argued that the state failed to prove that the victim answered the phone because the defendant’s call had been recorded by the victim’s answering machine, and she simply listened to the message through the machine after the defendant had already hung up.

        • Outcome: The court upheld the conviction, and held that defendant’s call to the victim’s answering machine satisfied the strictures of the statute. The court explained that “[w]hen the victim pushed a button on the machine, she heard the message played back,” which constituted a “delayed answer.”4 The court reasoned that “[t]he fact that the victim was not holding her telephone to her ear at the moment that defendant was speaking does not lessen the harm she suffered and should not be the deciding factor in this case. Indeed, it is likely that the people the legislature most intended to benefit when it enacted ORS 166.090(1)(b)—victims of chronic, continuous telephone harassment—are also the people most likely to screen their calls through an answering machine or similar device. Defendant’s proposed reading puts those victims beyond the reach of this statute, unless they are willing to withstand direct telephone connections with their harassers.”5

        • Special Notes: The court determined that its holding was “consistent” with the definition of “answer” applied in State v. Lopez, where the court determined that the victim did not “answer” her phone as required by the statutory language (she either avoided answering after identifying the caller’s number on her caller ID, or had her husband answer for her). The court explained: “Central to our holding in Lopez was the fact that the victim was ‘not subjected to the message or voice of the harasser.’ Here, by contrast, the connection was completed, defendant projected his voice and unwanted message into the victim’s home, and the victim was subjected to that voice and was harmed by it. Lopez stands for the proposition that a victim must be subjected to a harasser’s voice and message to have ‘answered’ a harassing call under ORS 166.090(1)(b). Because that occurred in this case, Lopez supports our holding that the victim answered defendant’s harassing telephone call.”6 However, the dissent found Lopez inconsistent, and determined that defendant’s conduct did not constitute telephonic harassment, but rather, amounted only to attempted telephonic harassment. The court noted, “[u]nder ORS 166.090(1)(b), the telephone must be answered. The majority is concerned that interpreting ‘answer’ to exclude answering machines is contrary to modern methods of telephone communications. However, answering machines were not new technology at the time ORS 166.090 was enacted. If the legislature had wanted to include them as part of the telephone or as a method of answering, it could have done so. For now, however, [the statute] requires a traditional ‘answer’ of the telephone.”7

      3. K.H. v. Mitchell, 174 Or. App. 262, 27 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2001)

        • Procedural Posture: Defendant’s appeal from award of protective order against petitioner.

        • Law: Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.090 (Telephonic Harassment); stalking; 166.065 (Harassment).

        • Facts: The victim sought an SPO to restrain respondent from contacting her after he repeatedly made harassing anonymous telephone statements to her telling her over the phone that he wanted to “eat her pussy” and engage in other sexual acts with her, and making her hysterical. The respondent had been identified after the police had put a trace on the petitioner’s phone. The petitioner filed a Uniform Stalking Complaint, and the trial court entered a protective order. On appeal, the defendant argued that there “was no threat” to give rise to an SPO because “the evidence show[ed] that he merely stated his desires over the phone and asked whether petitioner would agree to sexual activity.”8

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the protective order and rejected respondent’s argument: “Respondent’s statements were not a request for consent. They instead conveyed a threat of serious personal assault. His statements reasonably ‘instill[ed] in [petitioner] a fear of imminent and serious personal violence[.]’ They were unequivocal and objectively likely to be followed by unlawful acts.”9

        • Special Notes: Although the court affirmed, it modified the SPO to narrow the strictures, because it determined that the order preventing contact with the petitioner and defining “contact” very broadly put too many restrictions on the defendant: “We share the trial court’s concern that its definition of contact, if applied with no qualification, would effectively force respondent to choose between moving from his home and being in violation of the [SPO]. . . We accordingly modify the order to prevent the respondent from (1) intentionally communicating by any means with the petitioner; intentionally initiating visual contact with petitioner; (3) intentionally following petitioner; (4) going onto petitioner’s property, her place of work, her school; and (5) waiting outside of her place of work or school. If this order proves insufficient to protect petitioner, petitioner may ask the court to modify it.”10

      4. State v. Keller, 40 Or. App. 143, 594 P.2d 1250 (Or. Ct. App. 1979)

        • Procedural Posture: State appeal from the lower court’s decision dismissing defendant on a harassment charge.

        • Law: Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.065 (“Harassment”).

        • Facts: Defendant was charged with the crime of harassment by a complaint that alleged he subjected the victim “to offensive physical contact” by spitting on him. The state contended that spitting should be considered a crime of harassment under ORS 166.065(1)(a), because “spitting on another can be an interference with the physical integrity of the victim that is comparable to striking, slapping, etc.”11 The court agreed, and rejected defendant’s argument that spitting was not “contact” because flesh was not literally hitting flesh. The court explained that such an interpretation would problematically “exclude from the range of prohibited ‘contact’ such acts as hitting another with a thrown missile, poking another with a stick, or carried to a logical extreme, striking the clothing rather than the flesh of the victim. We reject the suggested limitation of the meaning of ‘contact’ as untenable.’”12

        • Outcome: Reversing the decision of the lower court and remanding for trial applying the proper statutory interpretation.

        • Special Notes: A concurring opinion also determined that harassment should prohibit only “offensive” conduct, but the language itself actually calls for a prohibition on “nonconsensual contact”: “But whatever the intended dividing line between offensive and inoffensive contact, we are not aware of any definitions that would make it synonymous with the dividing line between consensual and nonconsensual contact.”13

      5. State v. Allison, 325 Or. 585, 941 P.2d 1017 (Or. 1997)

        • Procedural Posture: On appeal from defendant’s conviction for telephonic harassment.

        • Law: Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.090 (Telephonic Harassment);

        • Facts: The defendant was convicted of telephone harassment arising from 21 recorded messages he had left on his ex-girlfriend’s answering machine during a one-month period. The messages were abusive, and reflected the defendant’s displeasure that the victim was dating someone new—the messages were generally spoken and understandable. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to uphold his conviction for telephone harassment because his calls had a “communicative purpose.”

        • Outcome: The court reversed the lower courts’ judgment. The terms “no communicative purpose” is undefined in the statute, and the court determined that the legislature had “intended to prohibit the act of causing the telephone of another to ring when the caller does so with no intention of communicating with the person on the receiving end of the line. The court explained that legislature’s use of the words “communicative purpose,” without qualification, indicates that it did not intend to pass judgment on the content of the information that the caller intends to convey in causing the telephone of another to ring. “Had the legislature thought differently about that point, it would not have expressly required that an offender intend both to harass or annoy and to have no communicative purpose, as those elements would be duplicative.”14 The court then held that because an intent to harass and annoy and a lack of a communicative purpose are not the same thing, each of the 21 messages was a communication the defendant conveyed to the woman information about his thoughts and feelings: “Because each communication conveyed to the woman information about defendant’s thoughts and emotions about her, each had a ‘communicative purpose.’ In each instance, his ‘communicative purpose’ was to tell her that he did not want her to associate with someone else. Far from allowing an inference of defendant’s lack of communicative purpose, each of his recorded statements, viewed individually, demonstrated the presence of such a purpose,” and took it outside the realm of ORS 166.090.15

        • Special Notes: Notably, the court also rejected the argument that the number of defendant’s messages was relevant since he left the victim “essentially the same message over and over again.”16 The court explained that “[a]lthough defendant’s messages dwelled on a common theme, on each occasion, he used different words, thereby showing an intention to convey a distinct variant on that theme during each call. However, even if defendant had left exactly the same message on each occasion, e.g. ‘Do not associate with Joe,’ that fact could not support a finding that he lacked a ‘communicative purpose’ in causing the woman’s telephone to ring.”17

    4. Practice Pointers

      • Depending on the circumstances, a victim bringing a telephone harassment claim may have a battle to fight in Oregon, which interprets the relevant statute quite strictly. Repeated messages left on an answering machine may constitute telephone harassment, but repeated calls where the victim does not actually “answer” the phone do not qualify.18

      • Moreover, the court will consider whether the plaintiff had a “communicative intent” in the telephone call, and in doing so, repeated calls conveying the same or similar messages will be viewed separately from whether those calls are independently “communicative.”19

    1. State v. Lopez, 151 Or. App. 138, 949 P.2d 1237, 1238-39 (Or. Ct. App. 1997). 

    2. Id. at 1239. 

    3. Id

    4. State v. Norgard, 156 Or. App. 190, 967 P.2d 499, 500 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 

    5. Id. at 500. 

    6. Id. at 501 (citing Lopez, 849 P.2d 1237). 

    7. Id. at 502 (Wollheim, J., dissenting). 

    8. K.H. v. Mitchell, 174 Or. App. 262, 27 P.3d 130, 132 (Or. Ct. App. 2001). 

    9. Id. (citing Rangel, 977 P.2d at 385). 

    10. Id. at 134. 

    11. State v. Keller, 40 Or. App. 143, 594 P.2d 1250, 1252 (Or. Ct. App. 1979). 

    12. Id

    13. Id. at 1253; see also id. at 1253-54 (Buttler, J., concurring) (concluding that “the legislature intended the harassment statute to cover those petty batteries formerly covered by the assault statutes (when committed with the requisite intent) and that spitting in the face of another, being a battery, is ‘offensive physical contact’”). 

    14. State v. Allison, 325 Or. 585, 941 P.2d 1017, 1019 (Or. 1997). 

    15. Id. at 1020. 

    16. Id

    17. Id

    18. Lopez, 949 P.2d at 1238-39. 

    19. Allison, 941 P.2d at 1020. 

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  2. Eavesdropping

    1. Introduction

      These provisions are the state equivalent of the federal Wiretap Act. Taken together, the laws prohibit the use of recordings obtained through eavesdropping in litigation where those recordings were “intercepted” without the consent of the victim.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.535 – Definitions applicable to obtaining contents of communications

        As used in ORS 41.910 (Certain intercepted communications inadmissible), 133.723 (Records confidential), 133.724 (Order for interception of communications), 165.540 (Obtaining contents of communications) and 165.545 (Prohibitions not applicable to fire or police activities).

        (1) Conversation means the transmission between two or more persons of an oral communication which is not a telecommunication or a radio communication.

        (2) Person has the meaning given that term in ORS 174.100 (Definitions) and includes:

        (a) Public officials and law enforcement officers of:

        (A) The state and of a county, municipal corporation or any other political subdivision of the state; and

        (B) A police department established by a university under ORS 352.383 (University police departments and officers); and

        (b) An authorized tribal police officer as defined in section 1, chapter 644, Oregon Laws 2011.

        (3) Radio communication means the transmission by radio or other wireless methods of writing, signs, signals, pictures and sounds of all kinds, including all instrumentalities, facilities, equipment and services (including, among other things, the receipt, forwarding and delivering of communications) incidental to such transmission.

        (4) Telecommunication means the transmission of writing, signs, signals, pictures and sounds of all kinds by aids of wire, cable or other similar connection between the points of origin and reception of such transmission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, equipment and services (including, among other things, the receipt, forwarding and delivering of communications) incidental to such transmission.

      2. Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.540 – Obtaining contents of communications

        (1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 133.724 (Order for interception of communications) or 133.726 (Interception of oral communication without order) or subsections (2) to (7) of this section, a person may not:

        (a) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a telecommunication or a radio communication to which the person is not a participant, by means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, unless consent is given by at least one participant.

        (b) Tamper with the wires, connections, boxes, fuses, circuits, lines or any other equipment or facilities of a telecommunication or radio communication company over which messages are transmitted, with the intent to obtain unlawfully the contents of a telecommunication or radio communication to which the person is not a participant.

        (c) Obtain or attempt to obtain the whole or any part of a conversation by means of any device, contrivance, machine or apparatus, whether electrical, mechanical, manual or otherwise, if not all participants in the conversation are specifically informed that their conversation is being obtained.

        (d) Obtain the whole or any part of a conversation, telecommunication or radio communication from any person, while knowing or having good reason to believe that the conversation, telecommunication or radio communication was initially obtained in a manner prohibited by this section.

        (e) Use or attempt to use, or divulge to others, any conversation, telecommunication or radio communication obtained by any means prohibited by this section.

        (2) (a) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(a), (b) and (c) of this section do not apply to:

        (A) Officers, employees or agents of a telecommunication or radio communication company who perform the acts prohibited by subsection (1)(a), (b) and (c) of this section for the purpose of construction, maintenance or conducting of their telecommunication or radio communication service, facilities or equipment.

        (B) Public officials in charge of and at jails, police premises, sheriffs offices, Department of Corrections institutions and other penal or correctional institutions, except as to communications or conversations between an attorney and the client of an attorney.

        (b) Officers, employees or agents of a telecommunication or radio communication company who obtain information under paragraph (a) of this subsection may not use or attempt to use or divulge to others, the information except for the purpose of construction, maintenance or conducting of their telecommunication or radio communication service, facilities or equipment.

        (3) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(a), (b) or (c) of this section do not apply to subscribers or members of their family who perform the acts prohibited in subsection (1) of this section in their homes.

        (4) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(a) of this section do not apply to the receiving or obtaining of the contents of any radio or television broadcast transmitted for the use of the general public.

        (5) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(c) of this section do not apply to:

        (a) A person who records a conversation during a felony that endangers human life;

        (b) A person who, pursuant to ORS 133.400 (Recording of custodial interviews), records an interview conducted by a peace officer in a law enforcement facility;

        (c) A law enforcement officer who is in uniform and displaying a badge and who is operating a vehicle-mounted video camera that records the scene in front of, within or surrounding a police vehicle, unless the officer has reasonable opportunity to inform participants in the conversation that the conversation is being obtained; or

        (d) A law enforcement officer who, acting in the officers official capacity, deploys an Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology device that contains a built-in monitoring system capable of recording audio or video, for the duration of that deployment.

        (6) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(c) of this section do not apply to persons who intercept or attempt to intercept with an unconcealed recording device the oral communications that are part of any of the following proceedings:

        (a) Public or semipublic meetings such as hearings before governmental or quasi-governmental bodies, trials, press conferences, public speeches, rallies and sporting or other events;

        (b) Regularly scheduled classes or similar educational activities in public or private institutions; or

        (c) Private meetings or conferences if all others involved knew or reasonably should have known that the recording was being made.

        (7) The prohibitions in subsection (1)(a), (c), (d) and (e) of this section do not apply to any:

        (a) Radio communication that is transmitted by a station operating on an authorized frequency within the amateur or citizens bands; or

        (b) Person who intercepts a radio communication that is transmitted by any governmental, law enforcement, civil defense or public safety communication system, including police and fire, readily accessible to the general public provided that the interception is not for purposes of illegal activity.

        (8) Violation of subsection (1) or (2)(b) of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

        (9) As used in this section:

        (a) Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology device means a device that uses a high-voltage, low power charge of electricity to induce involuntary muscle contractions intended to cause temporary incapacitation. Electro-Muscular Disruption Technology device includes devices commonly known as tasers.

        (b) Law enforcement officer has the meaning given that term in ORS 133.726 (interception of oral communication without order).

      3. Or. Rev. Stat. § 165.543 – Interception of communications

        (1) Except as provided in ORS 133.724 (Order for interception of communications) or as provided in ORS 165.540 (Obtaining contents of communications) (2)(a), any person who willfully intercepts, attempts to intercept or procures any other person to intercept or attempt to intercept any wire or oral communication where such person is not a party to the communication and where none of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to the interception, is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.

        (2) As used in this section, the terms intercept and wire or oral communication have the meanings provided under ORS 133.721.

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Capell, 156 Or. App. 582, 966 P.2d 232 (Or. Ct. App. 1998)

        • Procedural Posture: Appeal from lower court denial of defendant’s motion to suppress a private citizen’s recording of defendant’s telephone conversation regarding a drug transaction.

        • Law: Eavesdropping and the “domestic telephone extension exception.”

        • Facts: The mother of a 19-year-old was worried about her son. With a component of her telephone equipment, she recorded with a component of her telephone equipment.1 The recording included a conversation between the defendant and the son regarding a drug transaction.2

        • Outcome: The court affirmed because the “domestic telephone extension exception” applied to the argument; thus the recording did not violate the federal wiretap laws under 18 U.S.C. § 2511.3

        • Special Notes: The legislative history declared that under the Fourth Amendment, “the deterrent of unlawful police conduct in was the goal.”4

    4. Practice Pointers

      Nothing relevant at this time.

    1. State v. Capell, 156 Or. App. 582, 966 P.2d 232, 233 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 

    2. Id. at 233. 

    3. Id. at 234. 

    4. Id

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  3. Stalking

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is repeatedly harassed, the State may charge a defendant with stalking. This law may come into apply to situations of cyberstalking and cybercrime, both of which are becoming increasingly common.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.732 - Stalking

        (1) A person commits the crime of stalking if:

        (a) The person knowingly alarms or coerces another person or a member of that person’s immediate family or household by engaging in repeated and unwanted contact with the other person;

        (b) It is objectively reasonable for a person in the victim’s situation to have been alarmed or coerced by the contact; and

        (c) The repeated and unwanted contact causes the victim reasonable apprehension regarding the personal safety of the victim or a member of the victim’s immediate family or household.

        (2) (a) Stalking is a Class A misdemeanor.

        (b) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of this subsection, stalking is a Class C felony if the person has a prior conviction for:

        (A) Stalking; or

        (B) Violating a court’s stalking protective order.

        (c) When stalking is a Class C felony pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection, stalking shall be classified as a person felony and as crime category 8 of the sentencing guidelines grid of the Oregon Criminal Justice Commission.

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Rangel, 328 Or. 294, 977 P.2d 379 (Or. 1999)

        • Procedural Posture: On review of whether ORS 163.732 is overbroad on its face in violation of the Oregon Constitution and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

        • Law: Or. Stat. § 163.732 (Stalking).

        • Facts: Because the stalking statute regulates repeated conduct, including some types of communication (oral or written), defendant argued that the stalking statute violated his constitutional rights. The appeals court disagreed.

        • Outcome: The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute was not facially overbroad because it required a defendant’s “awareness of the nature of the conduct” and “consciousness that the conduct predictably will lead to a specific result. Accordingly, the statute is limited to a threat that convincingly expresses, to the addressee, the intention that it will be carried out, and that the actor has the ability to do so.”1

        • Special Notes: Although the statute does not specifically exempt all protected speech, the statute cannot be “overly broad” for that reason alone.2

      2. State v. Sierzega, 236 Or. App. 630, 237 P.3d 234 (Or. Ct. App. 2010)

        • Procedural Posture: On appeal by defendant from the trial court’s denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal.

        • Law: Or. Stat. § 163.732 (Stalking).

        • Facts: The victim worked in the Marion County Courthouse where she became acquainted with the defendant. The defendant then began calling her work, and her home, as well as her friends and family to try to get access to the victim. The victim spoke to a detective at the local police department and asked him to tell the defendant to leave her alone. He spoke to the defendant and told him that he could be found guilty of stalking if he continued to bother the victim. Several weeks later, the defendant visited the victim at her office. Shortly after that, the defendant called the victim’s old office, but hung up when he was told that she no longer worked there. He then sent a fax to her new office asking her to marry him and called the courthouse several times to ask if she’d gotten the fax.

        • Outcome: The court reversed and remanded with instructions to enter judgment of conviction for only one count of violating an SPO rather than the three counts on which he was convicted at trial. Although the state had charged defendant with “engaging in repeated and unwanted contact” with the victim, on appeal, the court determined that only one of those contacts—the face-to-face communication with the victim at her office—was actionable conduct under the statute. The rest constituted “expressive” conduct, which was protected by the Constitution.3 The court explained that “on the record in this case, a trier of fact could have found that defendant made a single unwanted contact with [the victim] that included nonexpressive conduct that alarmed [the victim] and instilled in her a reasonable apprehension for her personal safety. The remaining contacts on which the state relies, however, did not qualify as repeated unlawful contacts for the reasons set out above. Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion for a judgment of acquittal.”4

        • Special Notes: The court noted that the case was “particularly disturbing,” because the evidence showed that “the defendant is mentally unstable and romantically obsessed with [the victim] to the point of disregarding reasonable requests by law enforcement officials that he leave [the victim] alone. The difficulty is that, in the absence of a qualifying threat, defendant’s communications with [the victim] did not cross the threshold beyond which expression loses its constitutional protection.”5

      3. State v. Shields, 184 Or. App. 505, 56 P.3d 937 (Or. Ct. App. 2002)

        • Procedural Posture: On appeal from defendant’s conviction for stalking and telephonic harassment.

        • Law: Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.732 (“Stalking”).

        • Facts: Defendant and the victim had been acquainted since 1996, and the defendant also knew the victim’s family—her two sons, her brother, and her mother. After the defendant expressed interest in a sexual relationship, the victim pulled back, but defendant began to frighten her. For instance, he showed up at her house drunk multiple times and refused to leave. He also would call her obsessively and threaten to hurt people around her. The victim brought charges and the defendant was convicted of criminal trespass and stalking, and was incarcerated. As a condition of his release on probation for his conduct, defendant was prohibited from going to the victim’s house or contacting her. However, upon his release, defendant returned to the victim’s home, sent her mail, and called her. Because of defendant’s telephone calls, the victim changed her telephone number three times. Defendant was reincarcerated for his probation violations, but he continued to send the victim mail and call her, and he also continued trying to pursue an intimate relationship with her, asking to marry her and making sexual advances. On the day the defendant was released from prison, he again called the victim’s home. The victim and her mother answered at the same time, and she pretended that she was not on the line. Defendant told the victim’s mother that he could call or come over whenever, and that he would not be stopped. The defendant called the victim at least ten other times during which he either spoke to her or simply hung up. Each time, the victim told the defendant to stop calling her. On appeal, defendant argued that the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal because the state’s evidence did not show that he had made a “threat” to the victim.6 Moreover, he argued that all of his allegedly improper conduct was “expressive” and therefore, not restricted by the stalking statute.

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the conviction, holding that the evidence sufficed to support a finding that the defendant had engaged in repeated and unwanted “contacts” with the victim. First, the court determined that several of defendant’s actions were “non-expressive.” However, the court also determined that there was sufficient evidence of nonexpressive contacts to allow the trial court to deny defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. The court explained: “On more than one occasion, the victim answered phone calls from defendant during which he did not speak. Those calls were nonexpressive acts. Although making telephone calls without speaking is not within the express terms of ORS 163.730(a) through (k), that is not dispositive because that list of ‘contacts’ is illustrative, not exhaustive. . . Here, when the victim answered telephone calls from defendant during which he did not speak, that conduct create a relationship or association between them that the victim clearly did not want, as shown by her telling defendant during every telephone conversation not to call her again.”7

        • Special Notes: Hang-up phone calls can be interpreted as nonexpressive acts that are considered contacts under the stalking statute.

    4. Practice Pointers

      • To commit the crime of stalking, a person must make unwanted and repeated (e.g., at least two) “contacts” as defined in ORS 163.730(3). Several examples of “contact” consist solely of communication (orally or in writing) between the actor and the alleged victim or a third person.8

      • Some courts have found constitutional overbreadth problems where the contacts alleged involve “communication,” since the statute “restricts speech, at least in part, because it criminalizes the inducement of alarm or coercion from the repetition of contacts with a victim and those contacts can include speech or writing.”9

      • It is important to note that in Oregon, the victim must point to a “qualifying threat” in order to establish a stalking claim.10

    1. Rangel, 977 P.2d at 386. 

    2. Id

    3. State v. Sierzega, 236 Or. App. 630, 237 P.3d 234, 237 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (noting that the Oregon Supreme Court held that ORS 163.732 limits any punishable expression to expression that consists of unambiguous, unequivocal communications, specific to the addressee, that instill in the addressee a fear of imminent and serious personal violence from the speaker and that are objectively likely to be followed by unlawful acts) (citing Rangel, 977 P.2d at 379 (concluding that ORS 163.732 was not overbroad)). 

    4. Id. at 239. 

    5. Id

    6. State v. Shields, 184 Or. App. 505, 56 P.3d 937, 940 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). 

    7. Id. at 941. 

    8. See, e.g. Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730(3)(d), (e), (f), (h) and (i). 

    9. Rangel, 977 P.2d at 383 & 387 (holding that Oregon’s stalking statute is not facially overbroad under Article I, section 8 or the First Amendment). 

    10. See Sierzega, 237 P.3d at 237. 

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  4. Menacing

    1. Introduction

      In situations where a WMC victim is harassed (either “electronically” or otherwise), the State may charge a defendant with menacing if there is evidence that the victim believes that the offender will cause the victim physical harm. It may be particularly apt in situations of cyberstalking and cybercrime, both of which are becoming increasingly common.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.730 – Definitions for ORS 30.866 and 163.730 to 163.750

        As used in ORS 30.866 (Actions for issuance or violation of stalking protective order) and 163.730 (Definitions for ORS 30.866 and 163.730 to 163.750) to 163.750 (Violating a court’s stalking protective order), unless the context requires otherwise:

        (1) “Alarm” means to cause apprehension or fear resulting from the perception of danger.

        (2) “Coerce” means to restrain, compel or dominate by force or threat.

        (3) “Contact” includes but is not limited to:

        (a) Coming into the visual or physical presence of the other person;

        (b) Following the other person;

        (c) Waiting outside the home, property, place of work or school of the other person or of a member of that person’s family or household;

        (d) Sending or making written or electronic communications in any form to the other person;

        (e) Speaking with the other person by any means;

        (f) Communicating with the other person through a third person;

        (g) Committing a crime against the other person;

        (h) Communicating with a third person who has some relationship to the other person with the intent of affecting the third person’s relationship with the other person;

        (i) Communicating with business entities with the intent of affecting some right or interest of the other person;

        (j) Damaging to the other persons home, property, place of work or school;

        (k) Delivering directly or through a third person any object to the home, property, place of work or school of the other person; or

        (l) Service of process or other legal documents unless the other person is served as provided in ORCP 7 or 9.

        (4) “Household member” means any person residing in the same residence as the victim.

        (5) “Immediate family” means father, mother, child, sibling, spouse, grandparent, stepparent, and stepchild.

        (6) “Law enforcement officer” means:

        (a) A person employed in this state as a police officer by:

        (A) A county sheriff, constable, or marshal;

        (B) A police department established by a university under ORS 352.383 (University police departments and officers); or

        (C) A municipal or state police agency; or

        (b) An authorized tribal police officer as defined in section 1, chapter 644, Oregon Laws 2011.

        (7) “Repeated” means two or more times.

        (8) School means a public or private institution of learning or a child care facility.

    3. Cases

      Research is ongoing. A search of Oregon law did not reveal any cases that are factually relevant or analogous to WMC’s target situations.

    4. Practice Pointers

      Nothing relevant at this time.

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  5. Intimidation (Oregon “Hate Crimes” law)

    1. Introduction

      Where a victim is specifically targeted because of his or her race, color, religion, ancestry, nationality, gender, sexual orientation, or mental, physical or sensory handicaps, this statute may provide relief.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.165 – Intimidation in the first degree

        (1) Two or more persons acting together commit the crime of intimidation in the first degree, if the persons:

        (a) (A) Intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause physical injury to another person because of the actor’s perception of that person’s race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin; or

        (B) With criminal negligence, cause physical injury to another person by means of a deadly weapon because of the actor’s perception of that person’s race, color, religion sexual orientation, disability or national origin;

        (b) Intentionally, because of the actor’s perception of another person’s race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin, place another person in fear of imminent serious physical injury; or

        (c) Commit such acts as would constitute the crime of intimidation in the second degree, if undertaken by one person acting alone.

        (2) Intimidation in the first degree is a Class C felony.

      2. Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.155 – Intimidation in the second degree

        (1) A person commits the crime of intimidation in the second degree if the person:

        (a) Tampers or interferes with property, having no right to do so nor reasonable ground to believe that the person has such right, with the intent to cause substantial inconvenience to another because of the person’s perception of the other’s race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin;

        (b) Intentionally subjects another to offensive physical contact because of the person’s perception of the other’s race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability or national origin; or

        (c) Intentionally, because of the person’s perception of race, color, religion, sexual orientation, disability, or national origin of another or of a member of the other’s family, subjects the other person to alarm by threatening:

        (A) To inflict serious physical injury upon or to commit a felony affecting the other person, or a member of the other person’s family.

        (2) Intimidation in the second degree is a Class A misdemeanor.

        (3) For purposes of this section property means any tangible personal property or real property.

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Plowman, 314 Or. 157, 838 P.2d 558 (Or. 1992)

        • Procedural Posture: Review re the constitutionality of the Washington intimidation statute.

        • Law: Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.165.

        • Facts: Defendant and three codefendants were charged with violating the Oregon intimidation statute, which makes it a crime for two or more persons, acting together, to “[i]ntentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause physical injury to another because of their perception of that person’s race, color, religion, national origin or sexual orientation.” The facts showed that the defendants attacked the victim, who spoke little English, and while attacking him, kept yelling “[t]alk in English, motherfucker.”1 Defendant demurred based on the grounds that the statute is unconstitutionally vague and that it burdens his rights to speak and to express his opinions freely. Defendant challenges only ORS 166.165(1)(a)(A).

        • Outcome: The Court upheld the statute as constitutional because the crime “is defined in sufficiently clear and explicit terms to apprise defendant and others of what conduct is prohibited.”2 The court also explained that there was no violation of due process, or that the statute improperly proscribed opinion. The hatred of another group was not the problem; however, committing a crime against a victim because of his or her membership in the group is a viable offense.3

        • Special Notes: The court determined that the statute was not void for vagueness under any clause of the Oregon or the United States Constitution.

      2. Simpson v. Burrows, 90 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (D. Or. 2000)

        • Procedural Posture: Magistrate judge findings of fact and conclusions of law following bench trial (the parties waived a jury trial).

        • Law: Intimidation; IIED; invasion of privacy; libel.

        • Facts: Plaintiff and her partner, June Swanson, purchased Christmas Valley Lodge and Restaurant from the Park and Recreation district to run the lodge as a restaurant and bar in the rural Oregon town. Plaintiff and Swanson renovated the Lodge after taking possession, and business was good. However, they then began receiving anonymous letters suggesting violence, targeting them because of their sexual orientation. For instance, one letter stated that the sale of the Lodge to “two lesbians” “brings an immoral and unfavorable element into our community,” and the sale to “perverts” is the start of a revolting development.”4 Other individuals in the community then began receiving anonymous letters as well. Plaintiff’s partner left, and the letters continued. Local law enforcement began an investigation and determined that the letters could be traced back to defendant Burrows and his family, and defendant eventually pleaded guilty to the charges levied against him. Regardless, plaintiff’s business suffered, and she eventually sold the Lodge at a loss of $63,000. Plaintiff sued defendant for civil damages, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, intimidation, invasion of privacy, and libel.

        • Outcome: The court granted plaintiff damages on her IIED, a violation of ORS 166.155 (intimidation in the second degree); invasion of privacy (public disclosure of private facts). The court did not find any liability on plaintiff’s claim for libel because the statements are either opinion or do not show enough facts to be susceptible of being proven actionable under a defamation theory. The court awarded plaintiff $52,500 on her economic damages for her invasion of privacy and economic claims, and $5,000 in punitive damages. The court affirmed the lower court.

        • Special Notes: The court denied defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees as well.5

    4. Practice Pointers

      • The statute “expressly and unambiguously requires the state to prove a causal connection between the infliction of injury and the assailants’ perception of the group to which the victim belongs.”6

      • Oregon courts have upheld the statute as constitutional, and have specified that it does not infringe on free speech/opinions because “[o]ne may hate members of a specified group all one wishes, but still be punished constitutionally if one acts together with another to cause physical injury to a person because of that person’s perceived membership in the hated group. (Indeed, one need not hate at all to commit this crime; one need only meet the four elements stated above.)”7

      • A victim or the Oregon attorney general can bring a civil claim for money damages, including, in some instances, punitive damages.

    1. State v. Plowman, 314 Or. 157, 838 P.2d 558, 560 (Or. 1992). 

    2. Id. at 561. 

    3. See id. at 165. 

    4. Simpson, 90 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. 

    5. Id. at 1131. 

    6. State v. Brown, 310 Or. 347, 800 P.2d 259, 265-66 (Or. 1990) (under ORS 163.095(2)(a), defining a form of aggravated murder, the state must prove a causal connection between the murder and the victim’s status as a witness, juror, police officer, or other person with duties to the criminal justice system); see also State v. Maney, 297 Or. 620, 626, 688 P.2d 63 (Or. 1984) (same). 

    7. Plowman, 838 P.2d at 563. 

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  6. Coercion

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is threatened by another “into taking or refraining from action,” the State may charge a defendant with coercion. A WMC victim may be threatened with the possible revelation of intimate photos (either over the internet, or otherwise), or other personal information he or she would prefer to keep private.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.275 - Coercion

        (1) A person commits the crime of coercion when the person compels or induces another person to engage in conduct from which the other person has a legal right to abstain, or to abstain from engaging in conduct in which the other person has a legal right to engage, by means of instilling in the other person, a fear that, if the other person refrains from the conduct compelled or induced or engages in conduct contrary to the compulsion or inducement, the actor or another will:

        (a) Unlawfully cause physical injury to some person;

        (b) Unlawfully cause damage to property;

        (c) Engage in conduct constituting a crime;

        (d) Falsely accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against the person;

        (e) Cause or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some persons business, except that such a threat is not deemed coercive when the act or omission compelled is for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act;

        (f) Testify falsely or provide false information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense; or

        (g) Unlawfully use or abuse the person’s position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely.

        (2) Coercion is a Class C felony.

      2. Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.285 – Defense to coercion

        In any prosecution for coercion committed by instilling in the victim a fear that the victim or another person would be charged with a crime, it is a defense that the defendant reasonably believed the threatened charge to be true and that the sole purpose of the defendant was to compel or induce the victim to take reasonable action to make good the wrong which was the subject of the threatened charge.

    3. Cases

      Research is ongoing. A search of Oregon law did not reveal any cases that are factually relevant or analogous to WMC’s target situations.

    4. Practice Pointers

      Nothing relevant at this time.

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  7. Extortion

    1. Introduction

      A person who publishes or threatens to publish intimate photos or videos of another with the intention of forcing the victim into conduct the victim would not have otherwise performed may be charged with extortion.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.075 – Theft by Extortion

        (1) A person commits theft by extortion when the person compels or induces another to deliver property to the person or to a third person by instilling in the other a fear that, if the property is not so delivered, the actor or a third person will in the future:

        (a) Cause physical injury to some person;

        (b) Cause damage to property;

        (c) Engage in other conduct constituting a crime;

        (d) Accuse some person of a crime or cause criminal charges to be instituted against the person;

        (e) Expose a secret or publicize an asserted fact, whether true or false, tending to subject some person to hatred, contempt or ridicule;

        (f) Cause or continue a strike, boycott or other collective action injurious to some persons business, except that such conduct is not considered extortion when the property is demanded or received for the benefit of the group in whose interest the actor purports to act;

        (g) Testify or provide information or withhold testimony or information with respect to another’s legal claim or defense;

        (h) Use or abuse the position as a public servant by performing some act within or related to official duties, or by failing or refusing to perform an official duty, in such manner as to affect some person adversely; or

        (i) Inflict any other harm that would not benefit the actor.

        (2) Theft by extortion is a Class B felony.

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Cole, 66 Or. App. 203, 673 P.2d 587 (Or. Ct. App. 1984)

        • Procedural Posture: Appeal from lower court order finding defendant guilty of attempted theft by extortion and theft by extortion.

        • Law: Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.075.

        • Facts: Defendant’s girlfriend was a tenant of an apartment house owned by the victim of the theft. When she moved out, she owed back rent and after continued failed attempts to recover the money, the victim finally submitted it to a collection agency. The girlfriend called the victim and told him to come to a designated motel where she would pay him the amount she owed. But when the victim arrived, the defendant came out of the closet with a gun and a camera, and ordered the victim to disrobe. Defendant’s girlfriend also disrobed and engaged in deviate sexual acts with the victim while the defendant took pictures. Defendant and his girlfriend then demanded that the victim pay them $100,000 or the photographs would be shown to his wife. After negotiating, they reduced their demand to $200. The victim went to his work and paid them the money. He did not receive the photographs, and the defendant’s girlfriend told him he’d hear from them tomorrow. The next day, the victim reported the incident to the police, and an officer went to his work to continue the investigation. While the officer was present the defendant’s girlfriend called and demanded more money, and defendant and his girlfriend were arrested. Defendant was convicted of extortion and attempted extortion. He appealed.

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the lower court’s finding that defendant was guilty of extortion and attempted extortion. Although defendant argued that he was not involved in his girlfriend’s demand, the court found that the state had offered sufficient evidence to show that he and his girlfriend had exercised an agreed upon plan of extortion of the $200 as a “down payment on a larger sum which they intended to collect from the victim.”1

        • Special Notes: Although the defendant argued there was no evidence that he was complicit in the extortion, the court determined that the state had put forth enough evidence to show that defendant was involved in the plan, had taken the photos, had threatened to show the photos to the victim’s wife, and had participated in the negotiation of the amount demanded.2

    4. Practice Pointers

      Nothing relevant at this time.

    1. State v. Cole, 66 Or. App. 203, 673 P.2d 587, 588 (Or. Ct. App. 1984). 

    2. Id. at 588-89. 

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  8. Trespass

    1. Introduction

      A WMC victim could bring a claim for criminal trespass if a defendant intrudes on his or her dwelling perhaps in an effort to stalk the victim.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.205 – Definitions for ORS 164.205 to 164.270

        As used in ORS 164.205 (Definitions for OS 164.205 to 164.270) to 164.270 (Closure of premises to motor-propelled vehicles), except as the context requires otherwise:

        (1) Building, in addition to its ordinary meaning, includes any booth, vehicle, aircraft, or other structure adapted for overnight accommodation of persons or for carrying on business therein. Where a building consists of separate units, including but not limited to, separate apartments, offices or rented rooms, each unit is, in addition to being a part of such building, a separate building.

        (2) Dwelling means a building which regularly or intermittently is occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present.

        (3) Enter or remain unlawfully means:

        (a) To enter or remain in or upon premises when the premises, at the time of such entry or remaining, are not open to the public or when the entrant is not otherwise licensed or privileged to do so;

        (b) To fail to leave premises that are open to the public after being lawfully directed to do so by the person in charge;

        (c) To enter premises that are open to the public after being lawfully directed not to enter the premises; or

        (d) To enter or remain in a motor vehicle when the entrant is not authorized to do so.

        (4) Open to the public means premises which by their physical nature, function, custom, usage, notice or lack thereof, or other circumstances at the time would cause a reasonable person to believe that not permission to enter or remain is required.

        (5) Person in charge means a person, a representative or employee of the person who has lawful control of premises by ownership, tenancy, official position or other legal relationship. Person in charge includes, but is not limited to the person, or holder of a position, designated as the person or position-holder in charge by the Governor, board, commission, or governing body of any political subdivision of this state.

        (6) Premises includes any building and any real property, whether privately or publicly owned.

      2. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.246 – Criminal trespass in the second degree

        (1) A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a motor vehicle or in or upon premises.

        (2) Criminal trespass in the second degree is a Class C misdemeanor.

      3. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.255 – Criminal trespass in the first degree

        (1) A person commits the crime of criminal trespass in the first degree if the person:

        (a) Enters or remains unlawfully in a dwelling;

        (b) Having been denied future entry to a building pursuant to a merchant’s notice of trespass, reenters the building during hours when the building is open to the public with the intent to commit theft therein;

        (c) Enters or remains unlawfully upon railroad yards, tracks, bridges or rights of way; or

        (d) Enters or remains unlawfully in or upon premises that have been determined to be not fit for use under ORS 453.855 (Purpose) to 453.912 (Governmental immunity from liability)

        (2) Subsection (1)(d) of this section does not apply to the owner of record of the premises if:

        (a) The owner notifies the law enforcement agency having jurisdiction over the premises that the owner intends to enter the premises;

        (b) The owner enters or remains on the premises for the purpose of inspecting or ting the premises or lawfully removing items from the premises; and

        (c) The owner has not been arrested for, charged with or convicted of a criminal offense that contributed to the determination that the premises are not fit for use.

        (3) Criminal trespass in the first degree is a Class A misdemeanor.

      4. Or. Rev. Stat. § 164.215 – Burglary in the second degree

        (1) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 164.255 (Criminal trespass in the first degree), a person commits the crime of burglary in the second degree if the person enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein.

        (2) Burglary in the second degree is a Class C felony.

    3. Cases

      Research is ongoing. A search of Oregon law did not reveal any cases that are factually relevant or analogous to WMC’s target situations.

    4. Practice Pointers

      Nothing relevant at this time.

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  10. Voyeurism

    1. Introduction

      A person may be charged with voyeurism if he or she invades the privacy of another by recording the victim without the victim’s knowledge or consent. The state of Oregon currently has no video voyeurism laws. However, individuals are currently lobbying to try to get such laws on the books.1

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      Not applicable.

    3. Cases

      There are no Oregon video voyeurism laws, and no cases that are factually relevant or analogous to WMC’s target situations.

    4. Practice Pointers

      Nothing relevant at this time.

    1. Ty Steele, “Victims fight back: ‘Look what we can do, not look what was done to us.’” available at, http://www.kval.com/politics/Dana-Bishop-Springfield-Oregon-Video-Voyeurism-200543181.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2013). 

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