Ohio Statutory Criminal Law

  1. Unauthorized use of property (including telecommunication devices)

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is harassed electronically through computer hacking, etc., the State may charge a defendant with unauthorized use of property. This statute may be particularly apt in situations of cyberstalking and cybercrime, where the defendant co-opts a victim’s personal email or social networking account.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Computer, cable, or telecommunication property, Ohio Rev. Code § 2913.04 (link)

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Cline, No. 07CA02, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1604 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2008)

        • Procedural Posture: Defendant challenged his convictions and sentences in the trial court for several crimes, including unauthorized use of a computer, conspiracy to commit aggravated arson, and others.

        • Law: Unauthorized use of a computer; conspiracy to commit aggravated arson; menacing by stalking; criminal mischief; intimidation of a crime witness/victim; telecommunications harassment

        • Facts: Defendant was found guilty of harassing three individuals after they each terminated an intimate relationship with defendant. Among other things, he stalked them, tampered with their property, threatened their lives, and accessed their email accounts without their consent, changed their passwords, and used the accounts to send unauthorized messages. For instance, he would access a victim’s email account and use it to impersonate the victim and send vulgar messages to others without her knowledge or consent.

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the conviction finding that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was guilty of the allegations.

        • Special Notes: Defendant argued that he could not be tried in Ohio because he had accessed the computer in a different county, through Yahoo’s network, which is based in California. But the court disagreed, holding that under R.C. 2901.12, governing venue, in a computer-crime case, “the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction containing any location of the computer, computer system, computer network, telecommunication, telecommunications device, telecommunications service, or information service, or in any jurisdiction in which the alleged offender commits any activity that is an essential part of the offense.”1

    1. State v. Cline, No. 07CA02, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1604, at *18 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2008). 

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  2. Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.21 - Telecommunications Harassment

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is harassed electronically or by phone, the State may charge a defendant with telecommunications harassment. It may be particularly apt in situations of cyberstalking and cybercrime, both of which are becoming increasingly common.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Telecommunications harassment, Ohio Rev. Code § 2917.21 (link)

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d 228 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008)

        • Procedural Posture: Defendant sought review of the judgment of the trial court convicting her of telecommunications harassment under R.C. 2917.21(B). Defendant contended that her conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence.

        • Law: Telecommunications harassment

        • Facts: Defendant E and the victim, G, were friends, but they had a falling out when E’s younger brother accused G of molesting him. An investigation revealed insufficient evidence to support the boy’s allegation. Several years later, the defendant posted on her MySpace page, a picture of the victim that was captioned “Molested a little boy.” When asked by school authorities to remove the page, she did so. Defendant was then charged with telecommunications harassment and convicted.

        • Outcome: The court reversed the judgment of the trial court and discharged the defendant because the State had failed to establish that defendant had made a telecommunication with the “specific intent” to harass where the defendant had a legitimate purpose for posting the accusation and did not directly “communicate” with the victim. The dissemination of the allegation could serve the legitimate purpose of warning others of what defendant believed was the victim’s criminal behavior.

        • Special Notes: Because telecommunications harassment is a “specific intent” crime, the State must prove the defendant’s specific purpose is to harass, which is more than simply establishing that the defendant knew her conduct would likely cause harassment: “The legislature has created this substantial burden to limit the statute’s scope to criminal conduct, not the expression of offensive speech. Whether E was liable for defamation was not established in the proceedings below and can be addressed in civil proceedings.”1

      2. Nicolazzo v. Yoingco, 898 N.E.2d 94 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pls. 2007)

        • Procedural Posture: On defendant’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff’s claims of defamation, false light, abuse of process, telephone harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress

        • Law: Defamation; invasion of privacy; telephone harassment; intentional infliction of emotional distress

        • Facts: Plaintiffs purchased a bulldog from the defendant, but then stopped making the required payments. The seller defendant filed suit and judgment was entered in his favor. The buyer completed a debtor questionnaire but failed to appear to answer additional questions and was held in contempt before a payment schedule was imposed. The plaintiff buyers then alleged that the defendant was using threatening/outrageous language on the phone and in emails, and that he had defamed the buyers on the internet.

        • Outcome: The court granted the seller’s motion to dismiss the buyers’ claims of telecommunications/telephone harassment for failure to state a claim (there is no civil action for telecommunications harassment), but denied dismissal as to the remainder of the buyers’ claims, finding that the seller failed to offer evidence that his statements were true and the buyers’ allegations supported claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy as well as abuse of process and intentional infliction of emotional distress.

        • Special Notes: There is no civil claim for telecommunications/telephone harassment under R.C. 2917.21 and 4931.31 (another statute entitled “Threat or harassment in telephone communication prohibited; directory notice,” which was repealed in 2010). R.C. 4931.31 stated: “No person shall, while communicating with any other person over a telephone, threaten to do bodily harm or use or address to such other person any words or language of a lewd, lascivious, or indecent character, nature, or connotation for the sole purpose of annoying such other person; nor shall any person telephone any other person repeatedly or cause any person to be telephoned repeatedly for the sole purpose of harassing or molesting such other person or his family.”

      3. State v. Cline, No. 07CA02, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1604 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2008)

        • Procedural Posture: Defendant challenged his convictions and sentences in the trial court for several crimes, including unauthorized use of a computer, conspiracy to commit aggravated arson, and others.

        • Law: Unauthorized use of a computer; conspiracy to commit aggravated arson; menacing by stalking; criminal mischief; intimidation of a crime witness/victim; telecommunications harassment

        • Facts: Defendant was found guilty of harassing three individuals after they each terminated an intimate relationship with him. Among other things, he stalked them, tampered with their property, threatened their lives, and accessed their internet email accounts without their consent, changed their passwords, and used the accounts to send unauthorized messages. For instance, he would access a victim’s account and use it to impersonate the victim and send vulgar messages to others without her knowledge or consent.

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the conviction finding that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was guilty of the allegations.

        • Special Notes: The court explained that the “gravamen of the offense of telecommunications harassment is not whether the person who received the call was in fact threatened, harassed, or annoyed by the call, but rather whether the purpose of the person who made the call was to abuse, threaten or harass the person called.”2 Thus, “[i]f a defendant’s purpose or intent in making the call cannot be proved by direct evidence, it may be established by circumstantial evidence; the facts and circumstances surrounding the call.”3

    4. Practice Pointers

      • Ohio courts have explained that although R.C. 2703.60 provides that anyone injured by a criminal act may recover damages in civil action unless specifically exempted by law, the statute is only a codification of the Ohio common law, and a civil action is not merged into criminal prosecution that arose from the same act or acts—it does not create a separate cause of action: “R.C. 2917.21 is criminal in nature and makes it a misdemeanor for the defendant to harass the plaintiffs.  The court can find no civil counterpart.”4 Thus, a plaintiff cannot make out a civil claim under R.C. 2917.21 based on repeated harassment by telephone or email because “there is no civil cause of action for telephone harassment.”5

        As one Ohio court has noted, telecommunications harassment is not meant to cover “annoying—but nonthreatening—comment[s] on a website”: “The First Amendment would not allow punishment for making a nonthreatening comment on the Internet, just as it would not for writing a newspaper article, posting a sign, or speaking on the radio.”6

    1. State v. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d 228, 230 (Ohio Ct. App. 2008). 

    2. Cline, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1604, at *28-29 (citing State v. Bonifas, 632 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)). 

    3. Id. at *29. 

    4. Nicolazzo v. Yoingco, 898 N.E.2d 94, 104 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pls. 2007) (citing McNichols v. Rennicker, Tuscarawas App., 2002-Ohio-7215, at ¶17 (Ohio Ct. App. 2002)). 

    5. Id. 

    6. Ellison, 900 N.E.2d at 231 (Painter, J., concurring). 

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  3. Ohio Rev. Code § 2933.52 - Eavesdropping

    1. Introduction

      This provision is the state equivalent of the federal Wiretap Act. The law prohibits the use of recordings obtained through eavesdropping in litigation where those recordings were “intercepted” without the consent of the victim.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Ohio Rev. Code § 2933.52 – Interception of wire, oral or electronic communications (link)

    3. Cases

      Research is ongoing.

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  4. Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.22 - Menacing

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is harassed (either “electronically” or otherwise), the State may charge a defendant with menacing if there is evidence that the victim believes that the offender will cause him or her physical harm. It may be particularly apt in situations of cyberstalking and cybercrime, both of which are becoming increasingly common.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.22 – Menacing (link)

        (A) No person shall knowingly cause another to believe that the offender will cause physical harm to the person or property of the other person, the other person’s unborn, or a member of the other person’s immediate family.

        (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of menacing. Except as otherwise provided in this division, menacing is a misdemeanor of the fourth degree. If the victim of the offense is an officer or employee of a public children services agency or a private child placing agency, and the offense relates to the officer’s or employee’s performance or anticipated performance of official responsibilities or duties, menacing is a misdemeanor of a first degree or, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to an offense of violence, the victim of that prior offense was an officer or employee of a public children services agency or private child placing agency, and that prior offense related to the officer’s or employee’s performance or anticipated performance of official responsibilities or duties, a felony of the fourth degree.

    3. Cases

      Research is ongoing.

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  5. Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.211 - Menacing by Stalking

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is repeatedly harassed, the State may charge a defendant with stalking. This law may come into apply to situations of cyberstalking and cybercrime, both of which are becoming increasingly common.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Menacing by Stalking, Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.211 (link)

    3. Cases

      1. Fouch v. Pennington, No. CA2011-10-75, 2012 WL 3158730 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012)

        • Procedural Posture: Ex-boyfriend of plaintiff-appellee appealed lower court’s decision granting ex-girlfriend’s petition for civil stalking protection order against him, granting protection for herself and her two minor children.

        • Law: Menacing by stalking; civil protection orders.

        • Facts: The parties were involved in a year-long turbulent romantic relationship. Plaintiff alleged that defendant repeatedly called her after they ended their relationship. She also alleged that he threatened her, hacked into her email accounts and Facebook account, and her cellular telephone account. Moreover, she claimed that he had used a website to veil his phone number so that when he called her, it looked like it was another caller. He also purportedly sent emails to her friends and family telling them that she had a mental disorder, and sent an email to her employer declaring that she’d divulged company secrets. Upon hearing the foregoing evidence, the lower court granted her motion for a civil protection order. On appeal, the ex-boyfriend argued that proof of a pattern of conduct alone is insufficient to establish menacing by stalking, and that she had produced insufficient evidence to show mental distress, since she had a long history of anxiety.

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the grant of the protection order. First, the court explained that a pattern of conduct can occur through any “knowing” actions by the defendant where two or more events occur on the same day. The court also explained that to establish “mental distress,” a petitioner need only show that the defendant knowingly caused the victim to believe that he or she would cause the victim mental distress. Accordingly, the court determined that there was sufficient credible evidence to support each element of the statute.

        • Special Notes: A victim of menacing by stalking need not show that he or she suffered actual mental distress, but he or she must at least show that the defendant knowingly caused the victim to believe that he or she would cause the victim mental distress.1

      2. Stockdale v. Baba, 795 N.E.2d 727 (Ohio Ct. App. 2003)

        • Procedural Posture: Defendant appealed the lower court’s decision finding in favor of two women on their claims against defendant arising from his continued menacing by stalking.

        • Law: Menacing by stalking

        • Facts: A defendant entered into a no-contest plea to menacing by stalking as to two women and entered into a settlement agreement with both of them. The women then brought claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, breach of contract, depression, fraud, and malice against him. They asserted that following settlement with the defendant, he posted to an Internet message board spiteful, hateful, and increasingly aggressive messages about both of them, which caused them to believe they were being stalked again.

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the lower court judgment. The court explained that defendant’s actions in posting to the internet message board were extreme and outrageous because it caused the plaintiffs to believe defendant was once again stalking them. The court also considered the evidence from the previous case in which the defendant was convicted of menacing by stalking.

        • Special Notes: The women were awarded damages for civil claims against the defendant, who had been violating criminal statutory provisions as to plaintiffs.

    4. Practice Pointers

      • To establish “stalking,” there must be a “pattern of conduct,” which is specifically defined in the statute as “two or more actions or incidents closely related in time, whether or not there has been a prior conviction based on any of those actions or incidents.”2

      • The statutory definition of “domestic violence” expressly includes a violation of section 2911.211.3

    1. Fouch v. Pennington, No. CA2011-10-75, 2012 WL 3158730, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2012). 

    2. Ohio Rev. Code § 2903.211(D)(1) 

    3. Ohio Rev. Code § 3113.31(A)(1)(b). 

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  6. Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.12 - Coercion

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is threatened by another “into taking or refraining from action,” the State may charge a defendant with coercion. A WMC victim may be threatened with the possible revelation of intimate photos (either over the internet, or otherwise), or other personal information he or she would prefer to keep private.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Coercion, Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.12 (link)

        (A) No person, with purpose to coerce another into taking or refraining from action concerning which the other person has a legal freedom of choice, shall do any of the following:

        (1) Threaten to commit any offense;

        (2) Utter or threaten any calumny against any person;

        (3) Expose or threaten to expose any matter tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, to damage any person’s personal or business repute, or to impair any person’s credit;

        (4) Institute or threaten criminal proceedings against any person;

        (5) Take, withhold, or threaten to take or withhold official action, or cause or threaten to cause official action to be taken or withheld.

        (B) Divisions (A)(4) and (5) of this section shall not be construed to prohibit a prosecutor or court from doing any of the following in good faith and in the interests of justice:

        (1) Offering or agreeing to grant, or granting immunity from prosecution pursuant to section 2945.44 of the Revised Code;

        (2) In return for a plea of guilty to one or more offenses charged or to one or more other or lesser offenses, or in return for the testimony of the accused in a case to which the accused is not a party, offering or agreeing to dismiss, or dismissing one or more charges pending against an accused, or offering or agreeing to impose, or imposing a certain sentence or modification of sentence;

        (3) Imposing a community control sanction on certain conditions, including without limitation requiring the offender to make restitution or redress to the victim of the offense.

        (C) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under division (A)(3), (4) or (5) of this section that the actor’s conduct was a reasonable response to the circumstances that occasioned it, and that the actor’s purpose was limited to any of the following:

        (1) Compelling another to refrain from misconduct or to desist from further misconduct;

        (2) Preventing or redressing a wrong or injustice;

        (3) Preventing another from taking action for which the actor reasonably believed the other person to be disqualified;

        (4) Compelling another to take action that the actor reasonably believed the other person to be under a duty to take.

        (D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of coercion, a misdemeanor of the second degree.

        (E) As used in this section:

        (1) “Threat” includes a direct threat and a threat by innuendo.

        (2) “Community control sanction” has the same meaning as in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Taylor, No. L-09-1092, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 309 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2010)

        • Procedural Posture: Defendant appealed his convictions, asserting that they were based on insufficient evidence.

        • Law: Coercion; menacing; violation of protection order

        • Facts: Defendant and the victim had dated on and off for 10 years. He came to her house and asked her to agree to have sex with him five nights a week; if she did not agree, he threatened to distribute postcards he had made showing her naked and in sexually compromising positions, which listed her name, address, phone number, work address, and work phone number. She did not agree to his request. She obtained an order of protection against him, and he then allegedly violated that by coming to her workplace. He testified that he made the 1,000 postcards to embarrass her because she had been unfaithful, and he claimed that was an affirmative defense to the coercion charge.

        • Outcome: The court held that the convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence showed that defendant’s act of printing 1,000 postcards listing the victim’s personal information, depicting her in sexually compromising positions, and threatening to publicly distribute the postcards was not a reasonable response to the victim’s alleged infidelities. Thus, the court properly rejected defendant’s affirmative defense of “reasonable response” under R.C. 2905.12(C).

        • Special Notes: Regardless of whether he was telling the truth, because defendant’s actions—the printing of 1,000 postcards listing victim’s personal information, showing her in sexually compromising positions, and threatening to publicly distribute the postcards—was not a reasonable response to the victim’s alleged infidelities.

    4. Practice Pointers

      • “Mental distress need not be incapacitating or debilitating.”1

      • It is the duty of the trier of fact to determine whether a victim suffered mental distress as a result of the offender’s actions.2 In order to make this evaluation, a trial court “may rely on its knowledge and experience in determining whether mental distress has been caused.”3

    1. Jenkins v. Jenkins, 2007-Ohio-422, ¶19 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007). 

    2. Middletown v. Jones, 856 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006).  

    3. Smith v. Wunsch, 832 N.E.2d 757, 762 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 

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  7. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2911.211 & 2911.21 - Criminal Trespass

    1. Introduction

      Ohio observes a cause of action for criminal trespass, but it is unlikely to be relevant to a WMC plaintiff.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Aggravated Trespass, Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.211 (link)

      2. Criminal Trespass, Ohio Rev. Code § 2911.21 (link)

    3. Cases

      Research is ongoing.

    4. Practice Pointers

      A violation of R.C. 2911.211, aggravated trespass, is specifically listed in the statutory definition of “domestic violence.”1

    1. Ohio Rev. Code § 3113.31(A)(1)(b). 

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  8. Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.04 - Intimidation of a Witness

    1. Introduction

      In situations in which a WMC victim is threatened by another in order to prevent him or her from testifying against his or her harasser, the State may charge a defendant with intimidation of a witness. As is the case with the crime of coercion, a WMC victim may be threatened with the possible revelation of intimate photos (either over the internet, or otherwise), or other personal information he or she prefers to keep private.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Intimidation of attorney, victim or witness in criminal case or delinquent child action proceeding, Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.04 (link)

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Cline, No. 07CA02, 2008 Ohio App. LEXIS 1604 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2008)

        • Procedural Posture: Defendant challenged his convictions and sentences in the trial court for several crimes, including unauthorized use of a computer, conspiracy to commit aggravated arson, and others.

        • Law: Unauthorized use of a computer; conspiracy to commit aggravated arson; menacing by stalking; criminal mischief; intimidation of a crime witness/victim; telecommunications harassment

        • Facts: Defendant was found guilty of harassing three individuals after they each terminated an intimate relationship with him. Among other things, he stalked them, tampered with their property, threatened their lives, and accessed their internet email accounts without their consent, changed their passwords, and used the accounts to send unauthorized messages. For instance, he would access a victim’s account and use it to impersonate the victim and send vulgar messages to others without her knowledge or consent. He also threatened them or hired others to threaten them in order to prevent them from testifying against him at trial.

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the conviction finding that the jury could have reasonably concluded that the evidence supported a finding that the defendant was guilty of the allegations.

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  9. Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.11 - Extortion

    1. Introduction

      A person who publishes or threatens to publish intimate photos or videos of another with the intention of forcing the victim into conduct the victim would not have otherwise performed may be charged with extortion.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1.  Extortion, Ohio Rev. Code § 2905.11 (link)

        (A) No person, with purpose to obtain any valuable thing or valuable benefit or to induce another to do an unlawful act, shall do any of the following:

        (1) Threaten to commit any felony;

        (2) Threaten to commit any offense of violence.

        (3) Violate section 2903.21 or 2903.22 of the Revised Code;

        (4) Utter or threaten any calumny against any person;

        (5) Expose or threaten to expose any matter tending to subject any person to hatred, contempt, or ridicule, or to damage any person’s personal or business repute, or to impair any person’s credit.

        (B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of extortion, a felony of third degree.

        (C) As used in this section, ‘threat’ includes a direct threat and a threat by innuendo.

    3. Cases

      Research is ongoing.

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  10. Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.08 - Voyeurism

    1. Introduction

      A person may be charged with voyeurism if he or she invades the privacy of another by recording the victim without the victim’s knowledge or consent. A WMC whose rights are violated in this manner should report the incident to the government, who will be able to charge the perpetrator accordingly.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      1. Voyeurism, Ohio Rev. Code § 2907.08 (link)

        (A) No person, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the person’s self, shall commit trespass or otherwise surreptitiously invade the privacy of another, to spy or eavesdrop upon another.

        (B) No person, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the person’s self, shall commit trespass or otherwise surreptitiously invade the privacy of another to videotape, film, photograph, or otherwise record the other person in a state of nudity.

        (C) No person, for the purpose of sexually arousing or gratifying the person’s self, shall commit trespass or otherwise surreptitiously invade the privacy of another to videotape, film, photograph, otherwise record, or spy or eavesdrop upon the other person in a state of nudity if the other person is a minor.

        (D) No person shall secretly or surreptitiously videotape, film, photograph, or otherwise record another person under or through the cloth being worn by that other person for the purpose of viewing the body or the undergarments worn by that other person.

        (E) Whoever violates this section is guilty of voyeurism.

        (1) A violation of division (A) of this section is a misdemeanor of the third degree.

        (2) A violation of division (B) of this section is a misdemeanor of the second degree.

        (3) A violation of division (D) of this section is a misdemeanor of the first degree.

        (4) A violation of division (C) of this section is a felony of the fifth degree.

    3. Cases

      1. State v. Dennison, Nos. WM-10-019, WM-10-020, WM-10-021, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1744 (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 2012)

        • Procedural Posture: Defendant sought review of the judgments of the municipal court convicting him on three charges of voyeurism (also known as public indecency) under R.C. 2907.08(B).

        • Law: Voyeurism

        • Facts: Defendant was charged with voyeurism after he surreptitiously videotaped and photographed nude men in a YMCA locker room on his cell phone. He argued that the facts were insufficient to establish an invasion of privacy because the men using the locker room had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

        • Outcome: The court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, explaining that the practical necessity that members of the same sex may share locker rooms to change clothes or use common showers at fitness facilities did not remove all expectations of privacy in such facilities. Persons using such locker rooms could reasonably expect that they would not be photographed in the nude while using the facilities.1

    1. State v. Dennison, Nos. WM-10-019, WM-10-020, WM-10-021, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1744, at *10 (Ohio Ct. App. May 4, 2012). 

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  11. Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.666 - Cyberbullying – H.B. 116 (Jessica Logan Act)

    1. Introduction

      In January 2012, Ohio passed HB 116 into law. The Act amended Ohio’s law regarding public school policy on bullying to include cyberbullying among other things. The act also provides for anonymous reporting of bullying incidents. Cyberbullying covers any use of electronic media to repeatedly harass and intentionally harm another, including email, texting, blogging, etc. The Bill was named for an Ohio teenager who committed suicide one month after high school graduation after a nude photo of her was circulated amongst her peers at her high school, and another nearby high school.

    2. Text of the Statute(s)

      Sub. H.B. 116 (2012) (link): “To amend sections 3313.666, 3313.667, 3319.073, and 3333.31 of the [Ohio] Revised Code to enact the “Jessica Logan Act” regarding public schools’ policies prohibiting harassment, intimidation, or bullying …”

      Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.666 District policy prohibiting harassment, intimidation, or bullying required (link)

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